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The Explanatory Gap Argument and Phenomenal States: A Defense of Physicalism 
 
Abstract 
 
The explanatory gap argument has been presented to justify the dualist reconstruction of the 
mind/body problem as a hard problem of consciousness. It is argued that there are some 
distinctive properties of the mind, construed as phenomenal states or properties, which are not 
susceptible to any physicalist explanation. Hence, the distinction between the mind and the body 
is further widened. This paper critically explains the explanatory gap argument. It argues that the 
argument, contrary to its aim, fails to undermine physicalism because there is, in reality, no gap 
in the world. The paper submits that the gap that exists in the explanations of consciousness is a 
conception, about and not any feature, of consciousness (by extension, the mind). Hence, even if 
the explanatory gap is sustained, it proves no point against physicalism and the physicalists’ 
account of the nature of consciousness in the world.  
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The Explanatory Gap Argument and Phenomenal States: A Defense of Physicalism 
 
Introduction 
 
In reformulating the mind/body problem, the concept of body is enlarged to include the 
brain and its cognitive properties and processes; the mind is construed as consciousness or 
mental state, and phenomenal consciousness as its distinctive property. Given the assumed 
difference between the properties of the body and the mind, the question – “why should physical 
processes in the brain give rise to the experiential riches of consciousness?” or “how and why 
phenomenal consciousness arises from physical properties and entities?” appears to be a 
rhetorical way of denying the monist’s (mostly the physicalist’s) position that consciousness and 
its properties are amenable to the natural laws of the physical sciences, through which the body 
is explained. This, in contemporary literature, is known as the hard problem of consciousness. In 
its simplest expression, “the hard problem of consciousness is to fully explain phenomenal 
consciousness - the subjective, qualitative dimension of our mental lives - in physicalistically 
respectable terms” (Wright, 2007: 301). To address the problem, two positions, among others, 
are prominently held. One of these is to uphold the dualists’ assertion that any explanation 
featuring only physical items, relations, and processes cannot explain phenomenal 
consciousness. Some scholars who hold this view are Chalmers (1996, 2010), Jackson (1982, 
1997), Levine (1983), McGinn (1991), among others. The other position affirms the physicalists’ 
denial that there is such a difficulty, and that a physicalist explanation of consciousness covers 
all there is to explain about consciousness. This position is supported by Carruthers (2000, 
2005), Dennett (1991), Tye (2000, 2009) to mention just a few. 
 
The dualist position on the hard problem of consciousness is that phenomenal 
consciousness is a distinctive kind of property which is separate from the physical properties of 
the body. The dualist justificatory arguments for this position can be found in three related 
arguments: the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap argument and the conceivability 
argument. On these arguments, there is a common ground for the position that there is an 
epistemic as well as metaphysical gap between physicalism and phenomenal consciousness: 
From the premise that we cannot deduce any physical truth about our mental experience from 
phenomenal truth about mental experience, the knowledge argument concludes that physical 
properties are ontologically different from mental properties. The conceivability argument, from 
the ground that one can rationally conceive of the physical truths in the absence of mental truth, 
concludes that mental properties and physical properties are ontologically separate. The 
explanatory gap argument, starting with the premise that mental properties cannot be explained 
by reference to the same explanation of physical properties, concludes that that each of these 
properties is ontologically distinct. The focus of this paper is the explanatory gap argument. The 
paper supports the physicalists’ response to the explanatory gap argument. It questions the 
inference of ontologically distinct properties of mental states from the inability to offer a 
conceptual account of one kind of properties in terms of the explanation offered for another kind 
of properties. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section carefully articulates the 
explanatory gap argument. The second section argues that the explanatory gap argument fails to 
support the reality of a property of consciousness which is not amenable to scientific 
investigation and theories.  
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The Explanatory Gap Argument 
 
The explanatory gap argument is the claim that certain aspects of our conscious mental 
life cannot be captured by any objective physical explanation. The claim is premised on the 
assumption that whatever physical explanation of a subjective conscious experience we might 
give will completely leave out a certain property of our mental life. The exact property that 
would be left out is what it is like to undergo the experience. This property is also referred to as 
‘phenomenal property of consciousness’, ‘qualia’, ‘subjective quality of experience’. For 
example, for a mental state, such as pain, there is what it is like to feel pain. To explain this 
property of pain is to explain phenomenal consciousness of pain. The point of the explanatory 
gap argument is that any objective causal explanation of pain, be it in biology, neuroscience, or 
psychology, will fail as a complete account of pain. This is because there is a property of pain, 
the phenomenal consciousness of pain, which the physicalist explanation of pain excludes, and 
this exclusion creates a gap in her explanation of pain (Levine, 1983: 354-361, Hardin, 1987: 
281-298, Block and Stalnaker, 1999: 315-360, Chalmers, 1996, 2002, 2010, Polycn, 2005: 49, 
Harman, 2007: 2 Tye, 2009: 237).  
 
Another sense of explaining the explanatory gap argument is to argue that one of the aims 
of science is to explain not only how things are in nature, but also to account for why things are 
as they are in nature. So, if it is the case that nature is one large, lawful, orderly system, then it 
should be possible to explain the occurrence of any part of that system in terms of the basic 
principles that govern nature as a whole. However, the deepest problem of understanding nature 
as a complete whole is, given its feature of subjectivity, the problem of explaining and 
accounting for consciousness. Proponents of the explanatory gap argument claim that a 
physicalist account merely explains, at most, the structures and functions of a phenomenon, but 
explaining structure and function is irrelevant to explaining consciousness, because 
consciousness lacks objective structure and function. Therefore, no physical account can explain 
consciousness. The explanatory gap argument is associated in its powerful variants with, among 
many others, Thomas Nagel (1997: 619-527), Levine (1983: 354-361, 2001:6), and David 
Chalmers (1996, 2003: 112-145; 2010).  
 
Let us take the lead of Joseph Levine in elucidating the explanatory gap argument a little 
further. A functional explanation of pain would enumerate the causal roles associated with pain. 
For example, we can say that pain is caused by damages to some tissues in the body; it causes us 
to cry ‘ouch’, and causes some involuntary actions in us, such as instant jerking, touching or 
holding of the affected part of the body, etc. Moreover, Levine accepts that in cognitive science, 
it is possible that pain is identified with the firing of C-fibers, and this explains why pain does 
what it is said to do. This is precisely the functionalist or physicalist account of pain. However, 
according to Levine,   
 
there is more to our concept of pain than its causal role, there is its qualitative character, how it 
feels; and what is left unexplained by the discovery of C-fiber firing is why pain should feel the 
way it does! For there seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally “fit” the 
phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some other set of phenomenal 
properties. Unlike its functional role, the identification of the qualitative side of pain with C-fiber 
firing (or some property of C-fiber firing) leaves the connection between it and what we identify 
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it with completely mysterious. One might say, it makes the way pain feels into merely a brute fact 
(Levine, 2001: 357).  
 
Hence, for Levine, the causal or functional aspect of a mental state is ontologically 
different from the properties of the mental state: the explanation of a mental state, such as pain, 
cannot suffice as an explanation of the phenomenal properties of pain. Furthermore, Levine 
argues that we have no idea of how the qualitative character could be a property of a physical 
object. There would be a gap in such an account. He gave an example, “as I now look at my red 
diskette case, I’m having a visual experience that is reddish in character. Light of a particular 
composition is bouncing off the diskette case and stimulating my retina in a particular way. That 
retinal stimulation now causes further impulses down the optic nerve, eventually causing various 
neural events in the visual cortex. Where in all of this (sic) can we see the events that explain my 
having a reddish experience? There seems to be no discernible connection between the physical 
description and the mental one, and thus no explanation of the latter in terms of the former” 
(Levine, 2001: 76-77). It is the lack of this connection that creates the lacuna being described as 
explanatory gap. However, as I shall argue in this paper, it is important to note that Levine’s 
assumption of an ontological distinction between a mental state, which is identified with c-fiber 
firing, and its properties is arbitrary. This is because, if, according to Levine, “there is more to 
our concept of pain than its causal role…” it follows that what is inadequate is our conception of 
pain, and this failure does not suggest that mental states and their properties are separate 
ontological entities. I shall return to this argument shortly, but let us understand the explanatory 
gap argument a little more. 
 
The explanatory gap argument becomes more explicit when considered alongside with 
Saul Kripke’s notion of a “rigid designator”.  A rigid designator is an expression which refers to 
or designates the same thing with respect to all possible worlds (Kripke, 1980: 48). For him, 
‘possible world’ is shorthand for what might have been the case. He uses the term ‘possible 
world’ to elucidate the point that descriptions might designate more than one object but proper 
names designate the same object in all possible worlds. So, if terms that refer to phenomenal 
consciousness (or qualia) and brain properties (or brain processes) are rigid designators, each of 
the terms would refer to ontologically distinct processes or properties. As a result, an identity 
statement such as “the feel of pain’ (qualia term) is the same as ‘c-fiber firing’ (a brain term)” 
would be false. This is so because each of the two terms rigidly designates distinct entities or 
properties, and there has to be an explanation that links the two ontologically distinct entities or 
properties with each other. It is the absence of this link that creates the gap in the functionalist or 
physicalist explanation of pain.  
 
To explain the explanatory gap in another perspective, consider these two identity 
statements: 
 
(a) “Water is H2O” 
(b) “Pain is c-fibre stimulation”. 
It could be argued that the difference between these statements lies in the kind of 
explanation derivable from each of them. In (a), the identification of water with H2O suggests 
that information about every property of water, such as its freezing and boiling points, its 
liquidity at a room temperature, its colourlessness, its transparency, etc, can be fully explained in 
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terms of H2O. Also, in (b), the identification of pain with c-fibre stimulation implies that 
information about pain is explainable in terms of c-fibre stimulation. However, proponents of the 
explanatory gap argument claim that there is more to the concept of pain that is not explained in 
terms of c-fibre stimulation: “There is its qualitative character, how it feels; which is left 
unexplained” (Levine, 1983: 375). Putting it differently, Campbell claims that “in particular, the 
identity statement (b) does not tell us why pain feels the way it does. The psychophysical identity 
statement (expressed by (b)) then leaves us with an explanatory gap that is absent in the case of 
water and H2O (expressed in (a)) (Campbell, 2009: 37). 
 
The explanatory gap argument, as it stands, has been challenged as being unsound. The 
reason is that the argument is based on a wrong comparison between mind and brain identity 
statements on the one hand and “normal” scientific identity statements on the other (Scheele, 
2002:333-342). The kinds of explanation warranted by the two identity statements (a and b) 
differ. Each of the two different concepts on the two sides of the psychophysical identity 
statement in (b), i.e., “Pain” and “c-fibre stimulation”, picks out different phenomena in two 
different domains: “pain” picks out a mental state, which is (traditionally) identified as a non-
physical phenomenon, and “c-fibre stimulation” picks out a purely physically identifiable 
phenomenon and properties. In view of this, the statement that identifies pain with c-fibre 
stimulation is neither a fully physical nor a fully psychological statement, and such an identity 
statement is not normal. In a normal identity statement, such as “Water is H2O”, the two different 
concepts – “water” and “H2O” –  pick out purely physical phenomena.  It is, therefore, wrong to 
compare mental-physical identity statement with a normal scientific identity statement like 
“water is H2O”, where the entities on both sides of the identity statement are fully physical. It is 
understandable to expect that a normal scientific identity statement such as ‘water is H2O’, 
would offer a complete explanation of water or H2O without any remainder. The point of the 
explanatory gap argument is that a psychophysical identity statement, such as ‘pain is c-fibre 
stimulation’ failed to yield a full explanation of pain or c-fibre stimulation, hence, the 
physicalist’s claim that the pain is the same as c-fibre stimulation is wrong. Obviously, the truth 
of physicalism seems to be unaffected by this reasoning. This is because given the understanding 
and usage of the concept of ‘pain’ as referring to a phenomenon which is different from the 
phenomenon referred to by the concept of ‘c-fibre stimulation’, an identity statement expressed 
by the two concepts would be a suspect. However, notwithstanding this error, there is the way 
things are in nature, which is not affected by the way we understand and use concepts. 
Physicalism is a theory about the nature of the world, and it asserts that the mental is physical. 
The truth of this assertion cannot be challenged by the way we understand and use concepts, but 
by examining the nature of phenomena in the world.  
 
Moreover, let us, for the sake of argument, accept the comparison of water-H2O and 
mental-physical identity statements. Proponents of the explanatory gap argument could argue 
that in the ‘water-H2O’ identity statement, given all the relevant empirical or molecular 
information about H2O, it seems impossible to deny that H2O are the defining characteristics of 
water. Hence, ‘water-H2O’ expresses a necessary truth, and we can say necessarily, what is 
explained by ‘water’ is explained by ‘H2O’, thus, there is no gap in the identity statement: 
‘water-H2O’. However, the mental-physical identity statement, “pain is c-fibre stimulation” did 
not express a necessary truth because ‘pain’ refers to phenomenal properties that are not parts of 
relevant physical and functional mechanisms referred to by ‘c-fibre stimulation’. This, therefore, 
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further confirms the claim of the explanatory gap argument that there are gaps in the 
psychophysical identity statement: “pain is c-fibre stimulation”.  
 
However, I think it is possible to argue that the conclusion derivable from above is 
unwarranted. This is because it could be argued that the same gap noticed in “Pain is c-fibre 
stimulation” could also be found in the water-H2O identity statement. According to Saul Kripke, 
the distinction between necessity and contingency is a metaphysical distinction about how the 
world is. If the world could not be different from the way it is, then facts or claims about the 
world are necessary. If, on the other hand, the world could be different from what it is then facts 
or claims about the world are contingent (Kripke, 1980: 36). The point that the water-H2O 
identity statement expresses a necessary fact about the world is, however, challenged by Hilary 
Putnam’s twin earth thought experiment where there is the possibility of the existence of a 
sample of water which does not contain two molecules of oxygen and one molecule of hydrogen. 
(Putnam, 1975: 215-271). This suggests that the world could be different from what it is, and the 
possibility of a world where water is XYZ suggests that it is a contingent truth that ‘water is 
H2O’. Thus, there is no asymmetry between ‘water is H2O’, and the mental-physical identity 
statement, “Pain is c-fibre stimulation” as alleged by proponent of the explanatory gaps 
arguments. 
 
What to deduce from the above is, according to Mark Bradley, “… either all such cases 
will involve explanatory gaps, and there is no special threat to materialism (or physicalism) from 
the existence of qualia, or there are no such cases which involve explanatory gaps, and so 
materialism (physicalism) is safe” (Bradley, 2003: 4). This conclusion puts defenders of the 
explanatory gap argument against physicalism in a dilemma. The proponents of the explanatory 
gap argument could, however, argue that the conclusion poses a false dilemma and insist that 
there is an explanatory gap in the mental-physical identity statement. This is because, granted 
that the water-H2O identity statement does not express a necessary truth, the alternatives to H2O 
are still microphysical properties. Hence, if water is H2O or water is XYZ, the identity of water 
with any of these microphysical properties offers, whether necessary or not, a completely 
physicalist explanation of water. However, in the case of mental-physical identity statement, 
what is missing is something that is completely different from what a physical or functional 
concept or principle can capture. Therefore, it is still intelligible to argue that the water-H2O 
identity statement offers a complete physicalist explanation, because any variation in it can be 
accommodated within the physical explanation. But there is a gap in the mental-physical identity 
statement, because the variation in it introduces a unique property which is not found within the 
domain of physical or functional explanation. The basis of my challenge against the explanatory 
gap argument is the introduction of this unique property. Given the introduction of this unique 
property, two implications are immediately derivable from the explanatory gap argument. First is 
that the explanatory gap argument establishes an ontological gap between physical and 
phenomenal properties, hence the world is bifurcated into two: physical and phenomenal, and the 
way to solve the mind/body problem is to extract facts from the world that bridge or close the 
gap. The harder problem would be what kind of fact would bridge or close the gap? Empirical 
facts would come from and would be about the observable, physical or empirical parts of the 
world, and this might not suffice as facts in the phenomenal or non-physical parts of the world. 
Hence, physicalism would irredeemably false. The second implication is that the explanatory gap 
argument establishes an epistemological gap; it is about our ability to know and conceptualize 
7 
 
the true nature of things, and the explanatory gap says nothing about the real nature of things in 
the world. The answer to the question, ‘how and why phenomenal consciousness arises from 
physical properties and entities?’ would not depend on ontological facts or what exactly obtain in 
the world, but upon the scope of our knowledge, the limitations of our knowledge claim, our 
knowledge and use of concepts, etc. Consequently, the explanatory gap proofs nothing against 
physicalism as an ontological account of world. Since the explanatory gap argument cannot 
obviously proof that physicalism is both false and true, in what follows, more arguments are 
proffered to answer the following question: ‘are there gaps in the world, so that physicalism is 
false, or there are no gaps in the world, so that physicalism is true?’ in favour of physicalism.  
 
What the Explanatory Gap Argument Proofs 
 
One physicalist position is that there is no gap in the physicalist explanation of 
consciousness, and by extension, of the mind, because there are no such gaps in the world, hence 
once the physical properties and processes of consciousness are explained, there is no problem of 
explaining any phenomenal properties of consciousness, because, according to the physicalist, 
such properties, if they exist at all, are also physical properties. In arguing for this position, 
physicalists argue that experiences are fully physical, and there is no explanatory gap posed by 
their phenomenology, so the supposed gap is unreal. For instance, Michael Tye argues that the 
so-called “explanatory gap” arises largely from failure to recognize the special features of 
phenomenal concepts (Tye, 1999, 707). According to him, phenomenal states, to which 
phenomenal concepts apply, are not subjective in the first person sense. If they were, they would 
have been distinguished from objectively observable states. Phenomenal states are not properties 
of the subject that has them; rather phenomenal states are observer independent properties of the 
world. The intuition that a phenomenal concept, for example, ‘pain’, must refer to phenomenal 
states, which are subjective properties of experience, and “c-fibre stimulation” describes an 
objective phenomenon –  is erroneous. This wrong intuition is the source of the claim that there 
is a gap between pain and c-fibre stimulation.  
 
Moreover, according to Tye, what is derived from the perspectival subjectivity of 
phenomenal states is that the phenomenal concepts that apply to the phenomenal states also share 
the feature of subjective perspectivity. In addition, given the perspectival nature of indexical 
concepts (the perspectival nature of indexical concepts is that each indexical concept such as 
‘this’, ‘here’, ‘that’, etc is a priori linked with the concept ‘I’ and other concepts that designate a 
one and only entity. So, each indexical concept incorporates a certain perspective, namely the 
very special, first person, independent or singular perspective); it is assumed that phenomenal 
concepts, which apply to phenomenal states, are also indexical concepts. Tye’s argument is that 
unlike an indexical concept where a specific identified entity is at the centre, what is at the centre 
of the phenomenal concept is not the self or any singly identifiable entity, but the phenomenal 
experience, which is firmly attached to objects being experienced. Therefore, irrespective of the 
idea of subjectivity suggested by the phenomenal concept, what the phenomenal concept refers 
to is not the individual using the concept, but the phenomenal state, and the phenomenal state 
belongs to the object of perception, not the owner of the experience (see, O’Dea, 2002: 169-181). 
Once it is clear that phenomenal states are properties of, and arise from objects, and, in as much 
as, experience of an object is fully explained physically, it follows that phenomenal states are 
also explained. Since an explanatory gap exists only if there is something unexplained that needs 
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explaining, and as it argued, there is nothing that needs to be explained, the conclusion is that 
there is no gap in the world. Thus, the explanatory gap argument fails to disproof the truth of 
physicalism (Tye, 1999, 719).  
 
However, it is doubtful that the argument above has successfully shown that there is 
nothing that needs to be explained. First, if, as Tye grants, phenomenal states are perceiver-
independent, what then does the idea of ‘point of view’ or ‘perspectival experience’ suggest? Let 
us accept Tye’s characterization of phenomenal states as properties attached to objects. Thus 
understood, these properties are susceptible to explanation by Physics. However, the point of the 
proponents of the explanatory gap argument is that peculiar to the subjects that perceive an 
object is ‘what it feels like’ to perceive the object. This, ‘what it feels like’ is what needs to be 
explained and captured with a concept. The ‘what it feels like’ is, according to the dualist, a 
subjective phenomenon, it is, therefore, proper to expect that the concept that captures be a 
phenomenal concept. Thus, phenomenal concept, contrary to Tye, expresses the point of view, 
the perspective of the subject that has the ‘what it is like’, and not another ontology. If this is 
right, then the challenge that an identity statement expressed by a phenomenal concept and a 
physical concept has gaps stands, because each of the two concepts picks out different kind of 
phenomena. There is a need for more explanation to justify an identity statement between them.  
Second, according to Tye, redness, the phenomenal property of red is embedded in red objects, 
say tomatoes, roses, etc. When I look at a rose, the redness I perceive is an intrinsic property of 
rose. It is what I experience when I perceive the redness of rose (Tye, 1995: 145). It is on this 
basis that the phenomenal concept, ‘redness’ is not indexical. However, if phenomenal states are 
object-independent, it is doubtful that the object-dependent intrinsic property, redness, perceived 
as part of rose, is the phenomenal state of my experience of rose. Surely redness is the property 
of rose, not of my experience. Redness of rose can be given cognitive explanation, what need to 
be explained are the properties of my experience and not the properties of the object. In view of 
this, the explanatory gap argument stands. Its claim is that explaining the property of redness as 
being embedded in the object I am perceiving is possible, but that such an explanation will leave 
out reddishness, the property of my experience of redness.   
 
In response to the above, I think that the fundamental assumption in the explanatory gap 
argument that the phenomenal state or property, identified as ‘what it feels like’, is subjective is 
derived from the idea that phenomenal concept is an indexical concept. This argument is not 
enough to establish the ontology of the phenomenal state as a distinct non-physical phenomenon. 
Truly, the idea of a phenomenal concept presupposes the existence of a phenomenal state or 
property, and since phenomena are ordinarily private or subjective entities as contrasted with the 
objective entities (Anthony Quinton, 1975: 2), it is correct to assume that the phenomenal state 
exists as a subjective entity not explainable by any physical concept. The error in this reasoning, 
however, is that the assumption that the phenomenal state is subjective because phenomenal 
concepts are used to referred to it. In this direction, it is important to note that Tye redefines his 
objection against the explanatory gap argument. He no longer believes that there are phenomenal 
concepts. He, however, reiterates his position differently. For him, the phenomenal character of 
the experience of red, for example, is in red. Thus, I am aware of the phenomenal character of 
the experience of red by being aware of red. When I introspect, my attention goes to the external 
quality red, and thereby I am aware of the phenomenal character of the experience of red. This 
suggests that red is the phenomenal character of the experience of red (Tye, 2009: 138-144). 
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Once a physicalist explanation of red is given, it suffices for an explanation of the phenomenal 
character of the experience of red. Unless the dualists have some other justification for the 
ontology of phenomenal states as distinct entities or properties, I think Tye’s idea that red is the 
phenomenal property of mental experience of redness prevents us from multiplying entities 
unnecessarily. Even if this particular phenomenal property of the mental experience of redness is 
not contained in the physicalist explanation of red, what to do is to expand the physicalist 
explanation of red to accommodate such a property.  
 
However, it is possible to argue that Tye’s identification of the phenomenal property of 
the experience of red with red is not clear. This is because the given the initial definition of 
phenomenal state or property of a mental experience as being subjective, it follows that the 
phenomenal property of the experience of red belongs to the subject who has the perceptual 
experience of perceiving a red object, and it is not clear how an explanation of a property that 
belongs to a red object being perceived suffices to explain the phenomenal property of the 
perceptual experience of the perceiver of the red object. If this distinction between the property 
of an object, and property of the perceptual experience of the object subsists, it is correct to 
submit that ontologically the two kinds of properties are distinct, and any explanation of one in 
terms of the other would further justify the claim of the explanatory gap argument. This 
argument, as earlier pointed out, is derived from our definition and understanding of phenomenal 
property of mental experience as a distinct entity in the world. What really needs to be 
established is that there is such a property that exists in the world prior to our conceptualization. 
Hence, one possible defense by the physicalist is that the gap in our explanation of mental 
experience in terms of physical terms is an epistemological gap which does not really exist in the 
world.  
 
Another physicalist response to the explanatory gap argument is to argue that there is an 
epistemic, but no ontological gap between the physical and phenomenal domains. Even though 
there is a gap between the physical or functional concepts of consciousness and phenomenal 
concepts of consciousness, an empirical study would reveal that the two concepts refer to only 
one entity or property in nature. So, the epistemic explanatory gap does not undermine 
physicalism. 
  
Parts of the arguments for this position are: Irrespective of the gaps in our understanding 
and the uses of concepts, wherein there is a controversy whether or not an explanation of concept 
a ‘x’ entails an explanation of concept a ‘y’, or whether or not a complete explanation of ‘x’ 
leaves out an explanation of ‘y’, the gap did not show that ‘x’ and ‘y’ are names of two distinct 
properties in nature. In fact, by means of empirical discoveries, ‘x’ and ‘y’ may refer to one and 
the same thing. Moreover, the identity between physical concepts and phenomenal concepts 
could be contingent. There is, however, a sort of empirical necessity that explains the identity 
between physical properties and phenomenal properties. It is also not important whether the truth 
of the statement of this kind of identity is known a priori or a posteriori. Empirical discoveries 
could either be a necessary fact or contingent fact. It is not compulsory that the discoveries are 
known a priori. A necessary empirical discovery is a fact which cannot change from what it is, 
but which is discovered through sense experience. An empirical discovery that is a contingent 
fact is a fact that can change, and is discovered through sense experience. An example of an 
empirical discovery which is necessary is “Water is H2O”. This is a fact about the water that, 
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given the empirical world, cannot be different from what it is, so it is necessary; but the truth of 
this statement is discovered through empirical investigation. It is not known a priori. This 
implies that if, by virtue of our empirical investigation, we are unable to discover the truth of the 
statement “water is H2O”; this would not suggest that water is not H2O. When, however, our 
empirical understanding improves, we would discover that the statement “Water is H2O” 
represents the truth. In view of this, physicalists have argued that the appearance of an 
explanatory gap in the case of pain and c-fibre stimulation is a function of the status of scientific 
discovery.  
 
Given that the discoveries in Molecular Science are already advanced and considered 
reliable, there seems to be no gap in the explanation of water in terms of H2O. There, however, 
seems to be an explanatory gap in the case of psychophysical identities. This, I would like to 
agree with Campbell, is not because the psychophysical entities are ontologically distinct, but 
because the understanding of the real nature of these entities is, at present, fairly rudimentary, 
immature and incomplete. It is assumed that as neurology, neurosciences, neurophysiology and 
neuropsychology progress, and we learn more about the brain and its properties, there is every 
reason to expect that the explanatory gap will be eliminated (Campbell, 2009: 37-38). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It must be noted that the status of the neurological, neuroscientific, neurophysiological 
and neuropsychological theories is a reflection of the epistemic limitation of human beings; it is, 
therefore, not a sufficient ground to conclude that physicalism is false. An objection to this 
physicalist claim, exemplified by Chalmers, is that current work on the neural basis of 
experience does not come close to addressing the hard problem of consciousness. Faith in the 
scientific approach is unjustified and blind to the philosophical nature of the problem (Chalmers, 
1996: xi-xiv). This objection could be turned around to justify the physicalist claim that the 
reason for the persistent problem of phenomenal consciousness is the immature status of 
neurology, and other disciplines concerned with the human nervous system, and that if we are 
patient, further discoveries in neuroscience would one day furnish us with the answers that we 
seek. Owing to our limitations in neuroscience, truths about phenomenal states or properties of 
mental experience are not now known. However, this does not deny the metaphysical position 
that everything that exists, including human beings, is nothing more than a complex physical 
system, which is ultimately and completely explicable in empirical terms. The fact that this does 
not fit well into what we know now does not refute the metaphysical claim that phenomenal 
properties of experience are part of the physical or functional properties of experience. With the 
advancement of our knowledge in neurology and other cognitive sciences, we might discover 
that the present gap is epistemological, and does not exist in the fabric of the world.  
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